The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisons: A New Look at Due Process for Prisoners by Gray, Karla M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 5 Article 14
1-1975
The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisons: A New
Look at Due Process for Prisoners
Karla M. Gray
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Karla M. Gray, The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisons: A New Look at Due Process for Prisoners, 26 Hastings L.J. 1277 (1975).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol26/iss5/14
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND PRISONS:
A NEW LOOK AT DUE PROCESS
FOR PRISONERS
In the past, correctional authorities exercised nearly absolute
power in the operation of this nation's prisons and were vested with
total discretion over the treatment of prisoners within the institutions.
Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of public concern over
the manner in which our correctional systems are maintained. At the
same time, the courts, recognizing the need to scrutinize more closely
the way in which inmates are treated, have departed from the "hands-
off" doctrine by which they traditionally deferred to the discretion of
institutional authorities when confronted with prison cases.' As a re-
sult, it is now recognized that prison officials have at least a limited
duty to protect the rights of inmates in their charge.
There has also been a recent judicial tendency to enforce rela-
tively strict procedural due process requirements in nonjudicial, or ad-
ministrative, proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has held
that due process is required in a variety of these nonjudicial settings
and has set forth the specific due process requirements to be applied..2
The most important of these cases, Morrissey v. Brewer,3 held that be-
fore parole may be revoked the parolee is to be provided with written
notice of the claimed violation, an opportunity to be heard and to pre-
sent documentary evidence, and the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine adverse witnesses (unless good cause is shown). In addition, he
is entitled to appear before a neutral and detached hearing body and
to receive a written statement as to evidence relied on and the reasons
for the revocation.4 These requirements were held applicable to pro-
bation revocation in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,3 with the added statement by
the Court that counsel should be provided when the probationer claims
1. 50 TEXAS L. Rnv. 155, 157 (1971). See text accompanying note 124 infra.
2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
3. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
4. Id. at 487-89.
5. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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that he did not commit a violation of probation conditions or that there
were mitigating circumstances which would be difficult for the proba-
tioner to present unaided. 6
Recent judicial cognizance of prison problems, coupled with the
imposition of due process requirements in nonjudicial proceedings, has
resulted in confusion surrounding prisoners' procedural rights.7 The
lower federal courts, relying on the administrative cases in determining
what process was due in prison disciplinary hearings, handed down an
ill-sorted group of decisions requiring different due process protections
in substantially similar cases.8
In an attempt to establish a definitive set of guidelines and to
settle the disparate results reached by the lower federal courts, the
United States Supreme Court in 1974 confronted the due process prob-
lem in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings in Wolff v. Mc-
DonnellY Basically, the Court rejected the necessity of many of the
strict protections required in parole and probation revocation hearings,
calling instead for a balancing of the state's interest in orderly discipli-
nary hearings with that of the inmate in obtaining a just resolution of
the proceedings against him. With the exception of a strict notice pro-
vision, the constitutionally required protections set out by the Wolff
Court rest entirely on the discretion of the prison authorities in their
capacity as guardians of institutional security and correctional goals; the
Court drew no express limitations on the exercise of this discretion.
This note presents the view that the minimum due process re-
quirements set forth in Wolff are constitutionally deficient and that the
balancing of interests approach used by the Court is both faulty and
impractical and will stimulate unnecessary litigation. It will be demon-
strated that a sounder approach to the resolution of the due process
problem in prison disciplinary hearings is to determine first the function
or objective of the hearings-the substantive nature of the inquiry-
and the usefulness of the particular safeguard being considered in light
of that objective.'" When the right to such safeguards as have been
deemed appropriate has been extended to the prisoner, then the com-
6. Id. at 790.
7. 50 TExAs L. REv. 155, 157 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Palmigiano
v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (lst Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479
F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Sands v. Wain-
wright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part
sub norn. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Workman v. Kleindienst,
2 PRISON L. REP. 406 (1973).
9. 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
10. Tobriner & Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"? Parolees and Prisoners, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 801, 803 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tobriner & Cohen].
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peting interests of the parties should be scrutinized to determine
whether the right may be limited or qualified. Following an examina-
tion of the explicit holdings in Wolff, the suggested approach will be
developed and applied to a variety of potential due process require-
ments in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings to determine
what protections should be extended and in what circumstances they
may be qualified.
Wolff v. McDonnell
Wolff v. McDonnell was instituted as a class action by an inmate
in the Nebraska prison system, alleging that prison disciplinary pro-
cedures which could result in the loss of good time,1 violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause. 2 The district court of
Nebraska, considering itself bound by prior circuit authority, rejected
plaintiff's procedural due process claim.13  The court of appeals
reversed, 4 holding that the due process requirements specified in
Morrissey"5 and Gagnon' should be followed in prison disciplinary
hearings.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and expressly
held, first, that a state prisoner's interest in disciplinary proceedings is
included in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process concept of
"liberty,' 7 to the extent that a prisoner faced with the loss of good
time credit following alleged serious misconduct is entitled to "those
minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances."' 8
Having made this determination, the Court proceeded to delineate
which procedural safeguards are constitutionally due. It reiterated its
view that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion."' 9  In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision that the Morrissey-
Gagnon procedures were fully applicable in the context of prison
disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court stated that "[flor the
11. "Good time" is a statutory method by which an inmate can reduce his prison
term, for parole purposes, through good behavior. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,107 (1971).
See also CAL. PEN. CODE § 2920 (West 1970); N.Y. CoRmEc. LAw §§ 803-04 (MeKin-
ney 1968).
12. 94 S. Ct. at 2973.
13. 342 F. Supp. 616, 627-28 (D. Neb. 1972).
14. 483 F.2d 1059, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1973).
15. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
16. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
17. 94 S. Ct. at 2975.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2977, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same immediate
disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee."2
The Wolff Court proceeded, in the tradition of Goldberg v.
Kelly, 2 to balance the competing interests of the parties in order to
arrive at the minimum due process requirements necessary in prison
disciplinary proceedings. It weighed the state's concern over discipline
within "a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who
have chosen to violate the criminal law"'22 against the inmate's interest
in securing a just determination of the charges against him which could
result in a further restriction of his liberty."
The Court concluded that in order to satisfy due process a disci-
plinary defendant must be given written notice of the charges against
him at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing, 24 as well
as, at the conclusion of the hearing, a written statement by the com-
mittee of the evidence relied on in reaching its decision. Where insti-
tutional safety might be endangered by such disclosure, certain items
of evidence may be excluded from the statement.2 5  The Court also
held that prisoners should be allowed to call witnesses and to present
documentary evidence when institutional safety or correctional goals
would not be jeopardized thereby.26
At the same time, however, the Court concluded that confronta-
tion and cross-examination of adverse witnesses are not constitution-
ally required because of the hazards they would present to institutional
interests. No right to retained or appointed counsel was extended,
though in dictum the Court stated that an inmate should be permitted
to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or staff member if the inmate is il-
literate or the issue complex. 28  Finally, the Court found that the ad-
justment committee, comprised entirely of correctional authorities, was
sufficiently impartial to satisfy the due process clause.29 Clearly, the
due process protections required by the Court are far from absolute.
In each case, the prison authorities have wide latitude in granting or
withholding these protections, with little opportunity on the part of the
prisoner to challenge an unfavorable decision. As will be seen in the
following discussion, such an amorphous set of guidelines is neither
warranted nor necessary.
20. 94 S. Ct. at 2977.
21. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. 94 S. Ct. at 2977.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2979.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2980.
28. Id. at 2981-82.
29. Id. at 2982.
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Traditional Approaches to Due Process Requirements
Courts have relied on several different factors in determining what
process is due in nonjudicial proceedings. Frequently, the nature or
seriousness of the deprivation of liberty involved is an important con-
sideration. This factor was obviously relied on to some extent in
Wolff, where the Court observed that the deprivation of good time is
not the same immediate disaster for the prison inmate as the revoca-
tion of parole is for the parolee.30 Use of this approach would necessi-
tate, however, the subjective establishment of a "pecking order" of the
relative severity of different deprivations, 3 such as parole revocation,
loss of employment, and suspension of a driver's license. Even absent
the difficulty of "rating" the severity of the myriad kinds of depriva-
tions, such a process would consume years of confusing litigation.
Moreover, once the seriousness of each deprivation was established,
additional litigation would be necessary to determine what process is
due in each case.
Another suggestion has been that what process is due depends on
the "type" of proceeding involved, that is, whether the hearing is ad-
ministrative or judicial. This analysis rests on the assumption that
there is a hierarchy of due process hearings, ranging from the lowest
administrative hearings to a full-scale criminal trial, and that the due
process "package" contains more protections as one moves up the hier-
archy. 32 This approach ignores completely the competing interests of
the parties and the complexities of the situation at hand.
The third approach, and the one relied on most frequently by the
Supreme Court, 3 is to balance the competing interests of the parties.
Under this approach, the interests of the individual are balanced
against the interests of the party (the state or administrative agency)
seeking to deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment "liberty." The
difficulty with this "test" is that it provides an individual no rights to
due process at all until it has been shown that his interest in the pro-
tection outweighs that of the adverse party. This balancing approach
is vague and difficult to interpret and apply, and necessitates a total
case-by-case determination of minimum due process requirements.
The Substantive Nature of the Inquiry Approach
It is proposed that due process requirements which are more con-
30. Id. at 2977. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, I., concurring).
31. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 802.
32. Id. at 802-03.
33. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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crete, understandable and easily applied can be established by using
the following approach:
1. Determine the function or objective of the hearing-that is,
ascertain the substantive nature of the inquiry.
2. Examine the usefulness of the due process protection being
considered in relation to the objective of the inquiry, and ex-
tend the right to the protection if it is found appropriate.
3. Balance the competing interests of the parties to determine
whether the right should be limited or qualified.
As suggested by Mathew 0. Tobriner and Harold Cohen, the
"substantive nature of the inquiry . . . fixes its attributes and charac-
teristics"84 and is thus a preferable starting point for determining what
due process safeguards are necessary. If a hearing is primarily con-
cerned with factfinding, for example, certain due process protections
may be required which are simply not necessary in an inquiry which
is predictive or dispositional. This distinction may be illustrated by an
analogy to the field of criminal law. If a defendant pleads not guilty
to a charge, a trial is held to determine the facts at issue-whether
the accused committed the acts charged; the trial is thus primarily fact-
finding in nature. On the other hand, if the defendant pleads guilty,
the trial is replaced by an abbreviated hearing at which the judge
merely assesses the appropriate penalty; this proceeding is disposi-
tional.
The Supreme Court has recognized, on occasion, that the hearing
must be appropriate to the nature of the case 5 and that not all situa-
tions calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of protec-
tions.36 Having so concluded, the Court has unfortunately departed
from this logical starting point and determined minimum due process
requirements in relation to the factual situation in each case without
regard to the substantive nature of the inquiry at hand. This approach
has tended to confuse other courts which have attempted to apply de-
lineated minimum due process requirements to dissimilar factual situa-
tions.
It is contended that more concrete, definite due process require-
ments than the Court has heretofore announced are necessary to help
remove the confusion not only of the courts, but also of legislators and
administrators who are now being called upon to formulate rules, regu-
lations, and policies incorporating due process requirements in various
34. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 803.
35. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971); Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
36. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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contexts. '7 As long as the Supreme Court continues with the case-by-
case "facts" approach it merely stimulates litigation each time a fact
situation arises which is not directly on point with a previously decided
case. The "substantive inquiry" analysis, followed by a balancing of
competing interests, would at least provide basic guidelines for the due
process necessary in hearings which are primarily factfinding, disposi-
tional, or predictive.3 Although competing interests are still balanced,
thus preventing the total elimination of case-by-case adjudication, the
approach suggested does establish more definite due process require-
ments. As a result, it lessens the arbitrary use of discretion while still
allowing an overriding state interest to limit or qualify the due process
rights extended.
Prison Hearings and Due Process
The prison setting produces hearing procedures of several dif-
ferent kinds. There are, for example, parole release hearings, pro-
ceedings in which an inmate admits a violation of prison rules, and
disciplinary hearings in which the inmate seeks to challenge or contro-
vert the charges against him." Applying the test just described, dif-
ferent due process safeguards might be required in each of these hear-
ing situations because of the varying nature of these settings.
Parole release hearings are primarily predictive or judgmental in
character: the parole board seeks to determine whether the inmate has
a good chance of "making it" in the outside world on the basis of his
past history, future plans, and job opportunities. A disciplinary pro-
ceeding in which the inmate has admitted his misconduct and desires
to offer no mitigating or justifying facts is primarily dispositional: the
appropriate institutional officer or hearing body merely imposes one of
the disciplinary sanctions prescribed by statute or regulation for the vio-
lation involved.
The prison proceedings which serve as the basis for determining
due process requirements in this note are those in -which an inmate
charged with serious misbehavior seeks to present a defense against
the charges. In order to apply the substantive nature of the inquiry
analysis, the nature of these proceedings must first be established. It
is apparent that these particular disciplinary hearings have both disposi-
tional and judgmental elements: if a sanction is found to be necessary,
the appropriate punishment will hopefully be determined by consider-
ing the inmate's prior conduct record and the penalty which will serve
the most useful purpose in furthering the inmate's rehabilitation.
37. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 804.
38. See generally id. at 801-11.
39. Id. at 804.
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Application of the Substantive Nature of the Inquiry
Approach to Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
The primary purpose of prison disciplinary proceedings in which
the inmate challenges the charges against him is a determination of
facts. The ultimate issue is, of course, whether an inmate will be
disciplined for misconduct. But first the hearing body must decide
whether the inmate in fact committed, without mitigation or justifica-
tion, the acts charged. Thus, the basic issue, and the substantive
nature involved, is a determination of adjudicative facts, those which
answer the questions of who, what, when, why, and where.40 This
adjudicative process performs a traditional factfinding role, analogous
to a criminal trial.4
Once it has been established that the substantive nature of prison
disciplinary hearings is to determine the facts involved in the alleged
misconduct, the next step is to consider whether the particular due
process safeguards under consideration would serve a useful purpose
at such a hearing.4 2  In other words, the safeguard sought "must be
weighed in the scale of its value in affording a fair hearing as to the
substance of the inquiry."" To this end, the particular safeguards will
be discussed individually to determine whether each is necessary to a
rational determination of the facts, since the emphasis of the require-
ments of due process is in bolstering the reliability of the factfinding
procedure.44 If the safeguards are found useful, they should be ex-
tended as due process rights in the prison disciplinary hearing context.
A determination of the efficacy of various due process protections
cannot, however, be the final step in determining due process. While
it is contended that the requirements must be as concrete as possible,
the rigid application of these safeguards would fail to take into account
the prison context itself. The necessity of maintaining security and
discipline within the prison and the complex relationships between in-
mates themselves and inmates and correctional staff members demand
that the competing interests of state and prisoner be weighed. Only
after such rights as have been found appropriate have been extended
will the competing administrative interests be balanced against the
prisoner's rights to determine if and when the right may be limited or
qualified. Only an overriding governmental interest will be sufficient
to limit an individual's right to a particular due process protection, with
40. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
41. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 809.
42. See id. at 803.
43. Id.
44. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
1284 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
the burden on the party (the prison authorities) seeking to curtail the
individual's liberty.48
Notice
The giving of adequate and timely notice is an elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding to be ac-
corded finality. 46 The function of notice is to clarify what the charges
are and to afford the charged person an opportunity to marshal the facts
in his defense.47
Once the function of notice has been recognized, the necessity and
usefulness of this due process protection in the factfinding milieu of
the prison disciplinary setting are not difficult to establish. Notice is
the foundation upon which the other due process safeguards, to be dis-
cussed below, rest: the disciplinary committee or board cannot prop-
erly determine the facts if only one side of the facts is presented to
it. In order for both sides to reach the committee, it is essential that
adequate written notice comprising the allegations against the inmate
be provided. Oral notice is not sufficiently precise to satisfy the re-
quirement and an inmate cannot refer back to it should he forget or
misunderstand any of the allegations. Further, written notice of the
charges should become part of the written record of the proceeding,
to protect both inmate and authorities on review of the hearing or at
any other time an inmate's records are reviewed.
48
The notice should also be timely; written notice given at the be-
ginning of the hearing would preclude the inmate from adequately pre-
paring his defense. The notice must be timely in two respects. First,
it must be given within a short time after the occurrence which is the
foundation of the charges, in order that possible witnesses will not for-
get their observations. The notice must also be given a reasonable
amount of time before the hearing so that the accused will have the
opportunity to seek help in his defense and to gather witnesses or other
evidence on his behalf. Written notice, given within forty-eight hours
of the charged offense and at least forty-eight hours prior to the hearing
would seem to satisfy these requirements.
It has been established that timely and adequate notice is not only
essential to a factfinding inquiry, but is also a prerequisite to any other
due process requirements. The state's interests must next be con-
sidered to determine if this safeguard may be qualified under any cir-
45. Hermann, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana & Harvey, Due Process in Prison
Disciplinary Proceedings, 29 GUMD PRAc. 79 (1972).
46. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
47. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
48. See notes 120-24 & accompanying text infra.
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cumstances. While the state's interests in acurately determining the
facts and in preventing arbitrary treatment coincide with those of the
inmate and thus appear consistent with this due process requirement, 9
there will be emergency situations in the prison context where this pro-
tection may be limited because of the necessity for maintaining institu-
tional order and security. During actual emergency conditions caused
by riots or rebellions (and not during the lock-downs which often fol-
low such occurrences), or when a prisoner is exhibiting violent and un-
governable tendencies, an inmate may be placed in segregation or iso-
lation prior to notice. 5° Immediately upon the quelling of the disturb-
ance, or, in the case of an individual inmate segregated because of his
violent tendencies, immediately after the prisoner has been placed in
segregation, the required notice must be given. 51
These limitations in times of emergency conditions, concededly
necessary for prison security, would seemingly exhaust the situations
in which summary sanctions may be imposed without prior notice and
hearing. In these instances alone, the necessity for administrative dis-
cretion outweighs, and thus qualifies, the inmate's right to due process
notice prior to discipline.
Witnesses and Documentary Evidence
The right to offer testimony of witnesses is the right to present
the accused's, as well as the accuser's, version of the facts to the hearing
body so that it may decide where the truth lies. 52 To suggest that this
due process protection is not essential in a prison disciplinary proceed-
ing is to ignore the factfinding nature of that proceeding.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to call witnesses
in one's own defense is fundamental,5" particularly where one chal-
lenges the charges as resting on incorrect or misleading factual prem-
ises.54 Unless the hearing body is in possession of all the facts upon
which its determination should rely, the issues cannot be properly and
fairly decided, and arbitrary action is likely to result. This right to
offer evidence other than the statement of the accused is even more
important where, as in prison disciplinary proceedings, there is the
added problem of an "unreliable" accused,5 5 whose own statement is
49. Note, Implications of Morrissey v. Brewer for Prison Disciplinary Hearings in
Indiana, 49 IND. L.J. 306, 309 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Implications of Morrissey].
See text accompanying note 96 infra.
50. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
51. Id.
52. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
53. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
54. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
55. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 1974).
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not likely to be readily believed. Thus, an inmate should, in the ab-
sence of countervailing state interests, be extended the fundamental
and essential due process right to call witnesses and to present docu-
mentary evidence in his defense.
While it has been suggested that "institutional safety" and "cor-
rectional goals" will be disrupted if inmates are allowed to call wit-
nesses in their defense, 6 these broad generalizations, if accepted,
could be used to limit or destroy every right of prison inmates and to
vest complete discretion, leading to arbitrary action, in prison adminis-
trators once again. Much more concrete arguments of compelling state
interest should be found if the right to call witnesses is to be qualified.
Prison authorities do, of course, not only have a legitimate interest
in maintaining order and security within the institution, they have an
affirmative duty to do so. An inmate's ability to call nonvoluntary wit-
nesses could substantially increase the risks of disruption and reprisal
among the inmate population" by, at the very least, increasing animos-
ity between various inmates and inmate groups. Recognition of the
deleterious effects on order and security which could result if inmates
were allowed to compel the attendance of witnesses in their favor leads
to the conclusion that a prisoner may call only voluntary witnesses to
testify on his behalf. Thus, in the case of nonvoluntary witnesses, the
state interest in maintaining security and order would appear sufficient
to limit an inmate's right to call witnesses in his defense.
Prison officials have also suggested that inmates would volunteer
to testify solely to avoid working. 58 Such an argument is easily coun-
tered, however, since disciplinary hearings could easily be scheduled
during nonwork hours.59
The contention that allowing testimony of witnesses on an in-
mate's behalf would unduly lengthen the proceedings and result in in-
efficiency is also untenable. The Supreme Court has said that "[p]ro-
cedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accom-
modate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular
interests of the person ... ,"0 Such a maxim cannot, of course, be
read as an absolute; a procedure which takes the time of the hearing
body without adding to the integrity of the factfinding process would
be merely wasteful.61 However, it would seem more important to
56. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979 (1974).
57. Id. at 2988 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting in part).
58. Implications of Morrissey, supra note 49, at 313.
59. Id.
60. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972). See text accompanying notes
76-77 infra.
61. Note, The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison Disciplinary Hearings, 42
FOpnDHAM L. Rnv. 878, 886 (1974).
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present all the facts to the hearing body so that a just determination
can be made than to preclude such presentation on mere efficiency
grounds. In any event, it is obvious that the hearing body has the in-
herent discretion to limit the number of witnesses called to avoid mere
cumulative evidence and to restrict the scope of the testimony to mat-
ters relevant to the issues involved.62
In conclusion, an inmate should be allowed to call witnesses in
his defense provided that such witnesses volunteer to testify. The
disciplinary committee may, however, limit the number of witnesses
called and the scope of the testimony in order to avoid repetition and
to hear only relevant testimony.
Confrontation and Cross-Examination
In a situation in which governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on findings
of fact, confrontation and cross-examination must be permitted. 3 In
fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n almost every setting
where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process re-
quires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnes-
ses.'  No statement, unless by special exception, should be used as
testimony until it has been tested by cross-examination. 65
In the prison setting, where jealousy, malice, and vindictiveness
may motivate the assertion of serious charges, the need for the protec-
tion afforded by confrontation and cross-examination is obvious. 60
Thus, it can be argued that the due process rights to confrontation and
cross-examination should certainly be extended to inmates facing
prison disciplinary proceedings. These rights, like the due process re-
quirements discussed previously, are not necessarily absolute; they may
be qualified to accommodate state interests if such interests are shown
to outweigh the individual's right to the safeguard.
6
7
Prison authorities argue against extending to inmates the rights to
confrontation and cross-examination in disciplinary proceedings. The
officials contend, first, that if inmates are allowed to cross-examine
prison guards the traditional relationship between guards and inmates
will be eroded and the authority of prison officials will be reduced.
68
62. Implications of Morrissey, supra note 49, at 313.
63. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
64. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
65. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVmENcE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
66. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
67. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285 (1973).
68. Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The
Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REv. 27, 53 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Millemanni.
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However, "authority premised only on power and an avoidance of any
outside scrutiny is not worth preserving, particularly at the expense of
a prisoner's right to a legitimate search for truth at the hearing."69 The
notion that pison officials have absolute discretion in controlling the
lives of inmates is finally dying, due in large part to judicial interven-
tion in prison administration.7" This antiquated idea of total discretion
must be rejected when it conflicts with a vital due process right. The
concern for administrative dislocation must yield when the accommoda-
tion of this interest conflicts with the necessity for implementing pro-
cedural protections to insure fundamental fairness.7
1
Correctional authorities also contend that institutional safety will
be disrupted if inmate accusers are cross-examined by the accused in-
mate.72  While it is true that there may be substantial risk of reprisals
when inmate accusers are involved, if the accuser's identity is known,
cross-examination of the accuser cannot further endanger him. By
analogy, risk of reprisals exists in criminal trials. In that situation the
accused is generally in a much better position to reach and harm his
accuser; yet few would suggest that the right -to confrontation and cross-
examination be curtailed because of this speculative risk. The safety
of inmates does not justify the wholesale denial of the right to confront
and cross-examine. It is -the duty of the correctional authorities to pro-
tect testifying inmates without interfering unnecessarily in the fairness
and reliability of disciplinary hearings.73
In the situation where the identity of the inmate accuser is un-
known to the accused inmate (and these instances will be few since
the great majority of charges made against inmates are initiated by
guards),7 4 the state's interest in institutional order and safety poses a
more difficult dilemma. While confrontation and cross-examination of
an "informant" would be of great value to the accused and might bring
to light the pressure put on inmates by guards to inform on others, the
identification of an "informant" would concededly increase the danger
of reprisals or repercussions by the accused inmate or his friends. At
this point the state's interests do appear to override those of the accused
inmate, and here his right to confront and cross-examine may be
denied. It has been strongly contended, however, that in such a case
69. Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for
Specific Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D.L. REV. 309, 324 (1973) thereinafter
cited as Wick].
70. See text accompanying note 1 supra & note 124 infra.
71. Clutchette v. Procumier, 497 F.2d 809, 819 (9th Cir. 1974).
72. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
73. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 819 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2990 (1974) (Marshall &_ Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting in part).
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the hearing committee has the affirmative duty to probe the credibility
of the "informant" in camera.75
Another argument that correctional authorities could make against
allowing the rights of confrontation and cross-examination would be
that such rights would result in longer and less manageable hearings.
The argument is no more convincing here than it was in the discussion
of the right to call witnesses: 76 "the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. ' 77 Of course, cross-examination
would, at the discretion of the hearing body, be limited to matters rele-
vant to the subject matter at issue, in order to prevent rambling ques-
tioning which would result in unduly long hearings without adding to
the integrity of the hearing process. 78
The final contention that has been advanced to justify the denial
of confrontation and cross-examination is that such rights would inter-
fere with the disciplinary process as a component of the rehabilitative
process.7 9 Whether prison officials themselves accept this contention
as true in the face of logic and authority, is, at best, questionable.
"[P]unishment, unless fairly and justly imposed, will not only fail to
serve as a deterrent to similar conduct but will also counter efforts at
rehabilitation."80  The government must show a "scrupulous concern
for 'fairness' and 'equal justice' if those convicted are to be reconciled
with the system." '  Fair treatment at the hands of others leaves an
inmate with no choice but to recognize his own misconduct. 82  This
reflection must surely be the basis for any real rehabilitation, though
rehabilitative programs are, of course, also essential to implement and
channel an inmate's changed perspective and to aid in his reintegration
into society. Since society as a whole, as well as the state and the
prisoner himself, has a stake in restoring the inmate "to a normal and
useful life within the law,"8 3 it is patent that fairness in disciplinary
hearings, which must normally include the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, is essential for rehabilitation.
75. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1290 (1st Cir. 1973).
76. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
77. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
78. See generally Note, The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison Disciplinary
Hearings, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 878, 886 (1974). See text accompanying note 62 supra.
79. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2980-81 (1974).
80. Hermann, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana & Harvey, Due Process in Prison
Disciplinary Proceedings, 29 GuiLD PRAC. 79, 88 (1972). See text accompanying notes
101-04 infra.
81. McGee, Blacks, Due Process and Efficiency in the Clash of Values as the Su-
preme Court Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK L.J. 220, 230 (1972).
82. Millemann, supra note 68, at 59; Comment, Criminal Law-Procedural Due
Process for Intra-prison Disciplinary Hearings: An Arkansas Analysis, 27 ARK. L. REv.
44, 63-64 (1973).
83. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
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In short, the fights to confrontation and cross-examination must
be extended to inmates facing disciplinary hearings except when the
identity of an inmate accuser is unknown to the accused. In those in-
stances, however, the disciplinary committee must probe the inform-
ant's credibility.
Legal Assistance
The necessity and usefulness of providing an accused with assist-
ance in his defence seems barely problematical.84 Since in prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings the adjudicatory process performs a role anal-
ogous to a criminal trial, its setting is the milieu in which lawyers
have traditionally operated: a prisoner is charged with the violation
of a prison rule and the determination of the facts will depend on testi-
mony and presentation of circumstantial evidence.8 5
Johnson v. Avery88 established the right of inmates to render
legal assistance to fellow prisoners where the state provided no alterna-
tive source of legal aid.87 The decision was premised on the considera-
tion that many inmates are illiterate and simply unable to represent
themselves adequately. 8 By analogy, an inmate without legal training
requires at least as much assistance in preparing a defense and cross-
examining witnesses as is necessary for composing a writ or petition
which can be copied from available formbooks. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli
the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he unskilled or uneducated proba-
tioner or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of
a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining
or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex
documentary evidence."8 9 Again, the analogy to inmates is clear.
Once the conclusion has been reached that the nature of the pro-
ceeding requires that an accused inmate have the right to some assist-
ance in preparing his defense, all that remains is to determine what
kind of assistance must be made available. While the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution requires that an accused be
given counsel at a criminal trial, prison disciplinary proceedings, al-
though basically similar, are not criminal trials,90 appointed counsel at
84. "Assistance" is used in this context to refer to nonprofessional assistance, that
is, assistance from one who is not an attorney, such as a paralegal, another inmate, or
a law student. "Counsel" or 'formal counsel" refers to members of the bar.
85. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 809.
86. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
87. Id. at 489-90.
88. Millemann, supra note 68, at 55.
89. 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
90. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 10, at 809.
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such proceedings is not constitutionally required. Where, however, the
charges against the inmate are to be referred for criminal prosecution,
the right to counsel would seem constitutionally protected as the inmate
faces complex problems of self-incrimination in each situation."
Although appointed counsel is thus not required, the question still
arises whether an inmate may retain an attorney for disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The possibility of retained counsel where appointed counsel
is not required has been upheld by the Supreme Court in at least one
other context,92 and by a lower court in a prison case. 3  This approach
seems to be more equitable than an "all or nothing" approach. How-
ever, it would appear that permitting retained counsel involves serious
equal protection problems unless other -types of assistance are provided
for those inmates without the resources to retain an attorney.
Three possibilities other than appointed or retained members of
the bar remain as means of assistance to inmates: fellow inmates, law
students or legal paraprofessionals, and members of the institutional
staff.94 Most prisons house inmates who, although not formally trained
in the law, have amassed large amounts of informal legal training while
incarcerated. These inmates must be allowed to assist an accused in-
mate in preparing his defense, on a voluntary basis. In addition, law
students or legal paraprofessionals could be utilized in the capacity of
counsel-substitutes to aid an inmate in the presentation of his defense.
The use of institutional staff presents obvious problems and should be
avoided unless there is no other assistance to be found. The staff
member would have the same difficulties in being impartial as do
prison officials sitting on the hearing boards.95 Furthermore, staff
members would seldom have either the interest or the necessary back-
ground in law to be of real assistance to the inmate.
The state and the inmate have similar interests in securing a just
and nonarbitrary determination of the facts.96 The necessity of provid-
ing assistance should be curtailed only if the state's other interests are
of such magnitude as to override this necessity. The state may contend
that inserting inmate assistance into the disciplinary procedure will re-
sult in that procedure taking on an adversary cast. But "[ilt is simply
illogical to conclude that prison disciplinary hearings are non-adversar-
ial."'97 The disciplinary committee is faced with determining whether
91. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1974).
92. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (termination of welfare bene-
fits).
93. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1089 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
94. Id.
95. See text accompanying notes 106-13 infra.
96. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
97. Millemann, supra note 68, at 49; Comment, Federal Court Intervention in
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an inmate is guilty of the alleged misconduct which is violative of prison
rules. Thus, the very nature of the proceeding is adversarial and giv-
ing an inmate assistance in meeting the challenge to his liberty does
not add to this adversarial nature. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has concluded that even if a proceeding is nonadversarial, due process
protections are required.98
Another state interest to consider is that adding assistance might
well result in delays and practical problems. It is true that, were
formal counsel required, practical difficulties in providing sufficient
counsel and paying for their services might constitute a substantial bur-
den on the state's resources.99 However, formal counsel is not re-
quired, and any delays that the due process requirement of nonpro-
fessional assistance might occasion could be minimized by an effective
program of providing such assistance. The inmate's interest in receiv-
ing assistance in the preparation of his case greatly outweighs what
little delay might remain, particularly in view of the fact that efficiency
is not the purpose or objective of the disciplinary hearing.' 0
It was also suggested in Wolff that the introduction of formal
counsel into the proceedings would "tend to reduce their utility as a
means to further correctional goals."'' Although the Court was re-
ferring only to counsel, it seems likely that most prison officials would
view any form of assistance as equally disruptive. Exactly what this
type of argument purports to contend is difficult to pinpoint, but prob-
ably the argument rests on the "rehabilitation" and "deterrence"
theories.' 02 No better way has been found for generating the feeling
that justice has been done than to give a person in jeopardy of grievous
loss the opportunity to meet the case against him. 0 3 Only when an
inmate knows that justice has been done and he has received fair treat-
ment will he be forced to "square his conduct with himself."'1  And
State Prison Internal Disciplinary Hearings to Guarantee Fourteenth Amendment Pro-
cedural Due Process, 17 WAYNE L. Rnv. 931, 943 (1971).
98. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile court proceeding).
99. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2992 (1974) (Marshall & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting in part).
100. See text accompanying notes 60-62, 77 supra.
101. See 94 S. Ct. at 2981. The Court did give a qualified right to assistance by
other inmates. An inmate who is illiterate or who is faced with complex issues may
have a right to assistance from a more knowledgeable inmate; if he is not allowed to
seek such assistance himself, a fellow inmate or staff member should be appointed by
prison officials.
102. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
103. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
104. Comment, Criminal Law-Procedural Due Process for Intraprison Discipli-
nary Hearings: An Arkansas Analysis, 27 ARK. L. REv. 44, 63-64 (1973).
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similarly, the goal of deterrence by punishment can only be achieved
if the punishment is fairly and justly imposed.
To summarize, counsel should be provided an inmate facing disci-
plinary action if the alleged misconduct is to be referred to other au-
thorities for criminal prosecution. Otherwise, retained counsel or
counsel-substitute, in the form of fellow prisoners, law students, or
legal paraprofessionals must be made available to the inmate facing
possible grievous loss.
Impartial Hearing Body
A "'neutral and detached' hearing body"'10 5 would appear to be
essential in the context of factfinding inquiries such as prison discipli-
nary proceedings. The very purpose of a detached hearing body is to
decide fairly the factual issues involved without bias toward, or preju-
dice against, either of the parties. Without an impartial factfinder the
other due process requirements would have form but little substance
since the hearing body would tend to decide the outcome of the pro-
ceeding by following its own bias rather than by resolving the disputed
facts presented by both parties. Thus, the interests of both the state
and the prisoner in the fair and just determination of the facts can be
accomplished only by an impartial hearing body. Consequently,
prisoners facing deprivations at a disciplinary hearing must be accorded
the right to an impartial and detached factfinder.
The problematic aspect of this right is not, however, whether an
impartial hearing body is necessary, but rather, what constitutes such
an impartial body. It is obvious that a prison official who reported the
alleged violation or who investigated it cannot be permitted to serve
on the committee. 10 6 Similarly, staff members who will be called as
witnesses should not sit on the committee. 10 7  These persons are too
closely related to the factual dispute involved: it would be unrealistic
to expect them to divorce themselves sufficiently from their involve-
ment to become impartial.
The Supreme Court held in Wolff s08 that, barring the individuals
discussed above, a committee composed entirely of prison officials will
satisfy the due process requirement of a neutral and detached hearing
body.1"9 While it may be true that correctional authorities have the
105. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
106. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 716 (7th Cir. 1973); Landman v. Roy-
ster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971).
107. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 1974).
108. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
109. Id. at 2982. See also Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085 (M.D.
Fla. 1973).
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experience and expertise to qualify them to serve,110 it is also true that
such officials naturally tend to accept the word of the accusing guard. 1
A hearing body consisting solely of prison officials simply does not
and cannot meet the due process requirement. Even if it were con-
ceded that most prison officials would make a good faith effort to com-
ply with the requirement of impartiality, 112 they cannot be expected
to divest themselves of subconscious prejudices and antipathies toward
inmates nor to overcome their tendencies -to give more weight to the
statement of a guard simply because he is a part of the correctional
system. An impossible burden is placed upon prison authorities who
are permitted to be the only factfinders; such a situation is also in-
herently unfair to the accused inmate. It is unrealistic to contend that
those who promulgate the rules and regulations, who daily enforce
them, and who view enforcement as an important goal can possibly be
objective in this setting. Such a situation is akin to having a police
chief serve as the sole judge during the trial of a person arrested by
one of his officers. "Too many subtle and direct influences combine
to eliminate the possibility of a prison official serving as a truly inde-
pendent arbiter." 1 3
At the opposite end of the spectrum, it has been suggested that
in order to satisfy due process, the hearing comnm ittee must be com-
posed entirely of persons not charged with caring for prisoners or ad-
ministering the institution." 4 While this solution seems reasonable
and equitable on the surface, it does not adequately deal with the reali-
ties of the prison setting. A committee composed entirely of "outsid-
ers" would undoubtedly lead to more objective factfinding." 5 How-
ever, it would be difficult for such a committee to weigh the subjective
factors in the inmate's records and behavior in the institution context
in choosing a sanction tailored to the rehabilitative needs of the individ-
ual inmate." 6
When all the circumstances surrounding prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings have been taken into account, it appears that a hearing body
composed of both prison officials and "outsiders" would be as impartial
as is constitUtionally required, 117 and might well increase inmate confi-
110. See Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085 (M.D. Fla. 1973). In any
case this recognition of officials' expertise should not be overdone, for the result is over-
reliance on officials' discretion.
111. Wick, supra note 69, at 313; Implications of Morrissey, supra note 49, at 315.
112. See Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
113. Wick, supra note 69, at 324.
114. Id.
115. Implications of Morrissey, supra note 49, at 315.
116. Id.
117. See Millemann, supra note 68, at 55.
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dence in the disciplinary process"' by removing from prison officials
the total discretion customarily enjoyed by them in determining the
facts. A "mixed" board increases the chances for objective factfinding
without sacrificing the correctional goal of rehabilitation." 9
There appear to be no state interests which would outweigh the
inmate's due process right to an impartial, "mixed" hearing body.
"Outsiders" on the committee would neither lengthen the hearing nor
make it less manageable. Institutional order and security would not
be disrupted; the use of some "outsiders" would free staff members
to continue at their usual jobs within the institution.
Rehabilitative goals would not be impeded by the utilization of
"mixed" disciplinary committees. On the contrary, a truly impartial
board would, in the long run, undoubtedly further the rehabilitative
process and add to institutional order and security by alleviating dis-
ruptons which might occur when inmates feel they have been unjustly
dealt with by an arbitrary hearing body. Finally, the state might save
money by using volunteers from among public-minded citizens on the
hearing body. If any additional costs were incurred for compensating
these "outsiders," -these costs would seem insufficient to be balanced
realistically against the inmate's right to an impartial hearing body.
Written Statement of Findings
A written statement by the hearing body indicating the evidence
relied on in reaching its determination and -the reasons for the discipli-
nary sanction imposed (if any) serves several useful functions in a fact-
finding inquiry. Such a statement helps insure that the disciplinary
committee will act fairly.' 20 The statement also comprises, as does no-
tice, an important part of the written record of the hearing, an essential
consideration when review procedures of the hearing itself are pro-
vided. When an inmate's records are being reviewed for other pur-
poses, such as transfer to another institution or parole release, it is
equally important that the basis for the decision be adequately stated
in order to "protect the inmate against collateral consequences based
on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceedings."' '11
Thus, it would seem that -the inmate has a due process right to a written
statement of the evidence relied on by the disciplinary committee and
the reasons for any disciplinary action taken.
Since extending to the inmate the right to receive a written state-
ment is neither costly nor inefficient, the state's interests in practicality
118. Implications of Morrissey, supra note 49, at 315-16.
119. Id. at 315.
120. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979 (1974). See text accompanying
note 48 supra.
121. 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
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and efficiency are not infringed by providing the right.1 22  Further-
more, the right in no way interferes with the rehabilitative process.
121
The only state interest which may, in a few instances, override
the inmate's interest in this due process protection is that of institu-
tional order and security. In situations where an unknown inmate ac-
cuser has provided the committee with information, inclusion of the ac-
cuser's name in the written statement of evidence would have the same
potentially disruptive effect on institutional order and security as would
confrontation and cross-examination of the unknown accuser by the
accused. In these cases, it would seem that the name of the accuser
could be deleted from the statement of evidence relied on; the evi-
dentiary facts relied on, however, should be included. The disciplinary
committee should also include the fact that it probed the accuser's
credibility, as well as its findings as to that credibility. The inclusion
of such information will make the statement, as well as the evidence
actually relied on, as reliable and complete as possible. Only in the
situation of the unknown inmate accuser should the right to a complete
statement of evidence depended on be limited. In all other cases the
written statement should contain all the evidence relied on by the fact-
finder in reaching its decision.
Conclusion
The only way to limit the absolute discretion traditionally enjoyed
by prison administrators in this country's correctional systems is to im-
pose clear restraints upon their actions. Without such restraints the
prisons will remain the private domains of the correctional officials; the
result, the continuation of arbitrary action, not only runs counter to re-
habilitative goals but also can lead to massive and brutal rebellions by
the prisoners themselves.
With the demise of the judicial "hands-off" doctrine by which
courts consistently deferred to the judgment and discretion of prison
authorities, some restraints have finally been placed on correctional of-
ficials to prevent their interference with constitutionally protected
rights such as freedom of religion and freedom from criel and unusual
punishment. Unfortunately, however, when faced with an aspect of
prison administration as potentially disastrous to inmates as disciplinary
proceedings, the United States Supreme Court, in Wolff v. McDonnell,
again chose to defer to administrative discretion, stating that the Court
"should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the judg-
ment of prison administrators."' 24
122. See text accompanying notes 60-61, 76-78, 99 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 79-83, 101-04 supra.
124. 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
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The only unqualified due process protection afforded by the Wolff
Court is the right of the inmate to receive notice of the charges against
him. Moreover, although the opinion ostensibly entitles the prisoner
to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on by the hearing
body, the court held that items of evidence might be excluded upon
an official determination that personal or institutional safety would be
jeopardized by disclosure. Similarly, in considering other due process
protections, the Court apparently bowed to traditional notions of the
need for institutional control over prison disciplinary proceedings. As
a result, it vested broad discretion in the prison officials, limited only
by such generalized notions as institutional safety and correctional
goals.
Thus, the holding in Wolff v. McDonnell "deprives an accused in-
mate of any enforceable constitutional right to the procedural tools es-
sential to the presentation of any meaningful defense, and makes the
required notice and hearing formalities of little utility."'' 5 The Court,
in balancing the competing interests of the inmate and the prison ad-
ministrators, virtually ignored the inmate's interests by allowing "sound
discretion" and administrative efficiency to override such fundamental
due process protections as the right to call witnesses and to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 126
While it is conceded that the complexities of the prison setting
preclude the possibility of eliminating all administrative discretion, such
discretion must be exercised only in narrowly defined situations. The
substantive nature of the inquiry approach, followed by a balancing of
competing interests, establishes concrete due process requirements
which can be limited only in those instances in which the magnitude of
the state interest compels the exercise of discretion by prison authori-
ties.
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125. Id. at 2987 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting in part).
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